FOUNDING FATHERS-IN-LAW: JUDICIAL
AMENDMENT OF THE CANADIAN
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I
INTRODUCTION

Niccolo Machiavelli warned in The Prince about the perils of constitutional
amendment:
there is nothing more difficult to arrange, more doubtful of success, and
more
1
dangerous to carry through, than initiating changes in a state's constitution.

Machiavelli's words seem prophetic in relation to the persistent but ultimately
star-crossed attempts by the governments of Canada and most provinces to
amend the Canadian Constitution in conformity with the 1987 Meech Lake
2
Accord.
In one respect Machiavelli was wrong, however. There is a way, in Canada
and in other countries that treat their courts of last resort as constitutional
oracles, in which constitutional change can be achieved with a minimum of
difficulty and a certainty of success. This is the way of judicial amendment:
constitutional "interpretations" of the Constitution by the ultimate judicial
tribunal (the Supreme Court of Canada in my country now; the Judicial
Committee of the British Privy Council in the past) that have the result of
nullifying or radically altering the constitutional text or its authoritatively
accepted meaning. Such amendments, with consequences every bit as
momentous as those that are brought about through formal political
processes, can be accomplished swiftly and surely, and on the initiative, with
no obligation of prior public notice or consultation, of the nine mellowing
men and women (or a majority of them) who sit on the Supreme Court.
Some will disagree that judges can or do "amend" the Canadian
Constitution. Critics will point to the fact that Part V of the Constitution Act,
1982, entitled "Procedure For Amending Constitution of Canada," contains
Copyright © 1992 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba; Belzberg Visiting Professor of
Constitutional Studies, University of Alberta, 1988-91.
The research assistance of Dana Graves is gratefully acknowledged. The term "founding fathersin-law" is borrowed from a forgotten source. Since the first of the judicial amendments to be
discussed herein was fashioned by a woman, Madame Justice Wilson, the title ought also to have
referred to "mothers-in-law," but it is too long as it is.
1. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince 51, George Bull, trans (Penguin Books, 1961), excerpted in
Robert Sheppard & Micheal Valpy, The National Deal 7 (MacMillan of Canada, 1982).
2. 1987 Constitutional Accord (June 3, 1987).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 55: No. I

no reference to judicial amendment, and that section 52(3) of the same Act
stipulates that "[a]mendments to the Constitution of Canada shall be made
only in accordance with the authority contained in the Constitution of
Canada." 3 It should be noted, however, that although section 52(3) limits the
amendment process to techniques "in accordance with the authority
contained in the Constitution of Canada," the description of "Constitution of
Canada" set out in the preceding subsection is not an exhaustive one. While
section 52(2) lists a number of documents that the Constitution of Canada
"includes," it does not deny the possibility that other norms, judiciallyinvented ones among them, are also included.
Machiavelli mentioned that constitutional amendment is "dangerous to
carry through." Judicial amendment is as dangerous as formal amendment,
though the danger lies chiefly in the consequences rather than in the
implementation. No nine people, however wise and well informed, possess
the individual or collective powers of imagination necessary to foresee fully
the ramifications of major alterations to the constitutional norms upon which
their nation's legal and governmental structures are founded. Even if they
did, they would lack the range of experience and the moral authority required
for sound determinations as to the direction such alterations should take.
This is not to say that the democratic process necessarily produces better
results, but only that there is danger in entrusting constitutional change to the
unaided judicial process.
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate and examine the phenomenon of
judicial amendment of the Canadian Constitution, to contrast this process to
other related exercises of judicial review, and to suggest a possible method of
minimizing the dangers that accompany judicial amendment.
II
SOME ILLUSTRATIONS

A.

Rationing Equality

Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees
that "every individual"
is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or

physical disability.

The Supreme Court of Canada has stated in Regina v. Turpin4 that this vital
constitutional right does not belong to every individual, but is instead
3. Colleagues with whom I discussed my plans for this paper suggested that the phenomenon I
wish to deal with is really just radical constitutional interpretation, and that if I insist on referring to it
as "amendment," I should at least place quotation marks around the term. The argument I am
advancing is more extreme, however. The Supreme Court of Canada, and the Judicial Committee of
the British Privy Council before it, have effected, on occasion, not just something akin to
constitutional amendment, but changes so novel in their import and so unsupported by text as to
constitute amendments for all practical, and perhaps even formal, purposes.
4. [1989] 1 SCR 1296.
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restricted, "in most but not perhaps all cases," to members of "groups
suffering social, political and legal disadvantage" that "exists apart from and
independent of the particular legal distinction being challenged." 5 The
groups of extraneously disadvantaged persons to which the right to legal
equality is thus restricted have been labeled "discrete and insular minorities"
by the Court, borrowing an infelicitous phrase coined by Justice Stone of the
United States Supreme Court in a famous footnote to his opinion in United
6
States v. Carolene Products Company.
The facts of Turpin were so distinctive as virtually to render the case sui
generis. Their uniqueness casts doubt, in fact, on the wisdom of the Supreme
Court's decision to decide the case. The facts' distinctiveness may also help to
explain the Court's ruling in the case. The Criminal Code of Canada
contained an odd provision, repealed before the ruling, that permitted a
certain category of accused persons to elect trial by judge without jury in
Alberta, but not elsewhere in the country. Some accused persons outside
Alberta, who would have been entitled to this option if they had resided in
that province, contended that denial of the option to accused persons outside
Alberta constituted geographic discrimination and therefore violated their
right to legal equality in accordance with section 15(1) of the Charter. The
Supreme Court of Canada held, unanimously, in a decision written by Justice
Wilson, that the equality guarantee was not engaged by the uneven
application of the Criminal Code of Canada to different parts of the country,
because persons accused of criminal offenses outside Alberta "do not
constitute a disadvantaged group in Canadian society within the
contemplation of section 15." 7 Not being members of "discrete and insular
minorities," the defendants were not entitled to the protection of section
15(1).
Turpin was not the first case in which the term "discrete and insular
minorities" was used by members of the Supreme Court of Canada. In the
first section 15 case to reach the Court, Andrews v. Law Society of Alberta,8 the
Carolene Products footnote was quoted by both Justice McIntyre, 9 whose
dissenting reasons were approved in this respect by the majority, and Justice
Wilson,' 0 who concurred with the majority. In Andrews, unlike in Turpin,
neither the expression nor the concept it was thought to encapsulate was
crucial to the outcome of the case.
I have criticized Turpin and the "discrete and insular minorities" concept
elsewhere. II My purpose here is different: to advance the proposition that the
decision amounted to a constitutional amendment.
5. Id at 1332-33.
6. 304 US 144, 152-53 n4 (1938).
7. Tuypin, [1989] 1 SCR at 1333.
8. (1989] 1 SCR 143.
9. Id at 183.
10. Id at 152.
11. Dale Gibson, Equality for Some, 40 U New Brunswick LJ 2 (1991). The purpose of restricting
the equality guarantee to members of disadvantaged minorities is, of course, to prevent the
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Picture a lawyer's office in Winmonton, the capital city of Altoba. An
outraged client is explaining to his lawyer how he has been discriminated
against by a provincial government agency on the basis of political affiliation.
Altoba is currently ruled by a powerful Regressive Party government. The
client, a reputable construction contractor and a known supporter of the
Liberal Party, has conclusive proof that his tender to build a proposed public
building, though the lowest received, was not even considered by Public
Works Department officials because of his political associations. As we listen
in, the lawyer is shaking his head sadly:
Lawyer: I'm sorry to say that the Human Rights Code of this
province, which proscribes discrimination in the private
sector, expressly excludes governmental actions from its
ambit.
Client:
Well what about the Charter of Rights, or whatever it's
called. Doesn't that apply to governments?
Lawyer: Yes it does, but ....
Client:
And doesn't it prohibit discrimination?
Lawyer: It certainly does. (Pulls a book from a shelf, leafs through
it for a moment, and then hands it, opened, to the client.)
Look at section 15(1).
Client:
(After reading) I see the problem. Political discrimination
isn't mentioned.
Lawyer: No, that's not the problem. The Supreme Court of
Canada has ruled that grounds other than those listed are
covered by the Charter, so long as they are "analogous"
to the listed ones. And political discrimination might well
be considered analogous to religious discrimination.
Client:
So what is the problem?
Lawyer: The problem is that discrimination against Liberals
doesn't qualify for Charter protection because Liberals, as
a group, have never experienced historic disadvantage.
They may not be in power here in Altoba just at the
moment, but historically and generally Liberals can't
claim to have been discriminated against.
Client:
(Flabbergasted) What do you mean, "Liberals as a group,"
"historic disadvantage"?! I'm being discriminated against
now! What do history and other Liberals have to do with
it?
Lawyer: The protection of section 15(1) of the Charter is
restricted to members of "groups suffering social, political
and legal disadvantage . . . apart from and independent of

the particular legal distinction being challenged ....

"

guarantee being used to challenge affirmative action programs in favour of such minorities, as has
occurred in the United States. In Canada, however, it is an unnecessary precaution, since section
15(2) of the Charter explicitly permits affirmative action.
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Where does it say that? (Picks up and re-reads the
Charter text.) There's nothing here about groups, or
extraneous previous disadvantage. Not a word! What it
says, as plain as bread, is that "every individual is equal."
I'm an individual; so the Charter gives me the right to be
treated equally!
I'm afraid not. It's true that those are the words that
were enacted back in 1982, but ever since a Supreme
Court ruling in 1989 those words have to be read as if
they said: "Every individual who belongs to a group whose
members suffer disadvantage apartfrom and independent of the
particularlegal distinction being challenged is equal ... etc."

Client:
Lawyer:
Client:

So the Supreme Court has amended the Charter! I didn't
know they had the power to do that.
Well it really wasn't an amendment-just a radical
interpretation of the text.
Not an amendment? In a pig's eye! Only lawyers and
maybe Lewis Carroll could deny that it's an amendment,
and if Carroll were on the scene, he'd have trouble
keeping a straight face!

It must in fairness be said that this fictitious lawyer might conceivably
succeed on behalf of his client in a Charter challenge based on the contention
that members of political minorities have suffered historically at the hands of
community majorities, and that Liberals are a disadvantaged minority in that
particular jurisdiction at this particular time. A claim founded on freedom of
expression or freedom of association under section 2 of the Charter might
also succeed. But the possibility that such arguments might possibly succeed
does not alter the fact that the judicially created "discrete and insular
minorities" gloss has removed from section 15(1) of the Charter much of the
straightforward protection against inequality promised by its text.
The assertion that this is a consequence of interpretation, rather than a
modification of the Constitution, is based on the presence of the word
"discrimination" in the enacted text. Justice Wilson in Turpin and Justice
McIntyre in Andrews linked their importation of the Carolene Products footnote
to their view that proof of discrimination is essential to the success of any
claim under section 15(1) of the Charter. The language of the provision is no
doubt open to so restrictive a reading, even if it is not the only, or even the
most plausible, reading possible. It is the next stage of the Wilson analysisthat "discrimination" requires a "threshold" group disadvantage extraneous
to the situation complained about-which is impossible to classify as
"interpretation." Justice Wilson arrived at that conclusion after stating that
the "indicia of discrimination" include "stereotyping, historical disadvantage
or vulnerability to political and social prejudice."' 2 So far as "stereotyping"
12.

Turpin, [1989] 1 SCR at 1333.
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and "prejudice" are concerned, this assertion is hard to fault; one wellunderstood meaning of the term "discrimination"
is certainly
disadvantageous conduct motivated by preconceived stereotypes of the
capacities or other characteristics of certain types of people, rather than by
individuals' personal merits or demerits.
But there is an important, if subtle, difficulty with the other "indicia of
discrimination" in Justice Wilson's catalogue. "Historical disadvantage" and
"vulnerability" are not, like "stereotyping," elements of the act of
discrimination. "Historical disadvantage" is one consequence of discrimination
occurring over a period of time; "vulnerability" is a characteristic of those
who are most frequently the victims of discrimination. It is a nonsequitur to
move from the observation that certain groups of persons are statistically
most vulnerable to discrimination, with consequent historical disadvantage
over time, to the conclusion that discrimination can be experienced only by
members of those groups. It would make as much sense to "define" murder
in the following manner:
Murder involves unlawful premeditated homicide.
Members of disadvantaged groups and persons residing in
urban areas are statistically the most vulnerable to murder.
Therefore, the unlawful premeditated homicide of persons who
are not members of disadvantaged groups or who do not live in
urban areas does not constitute murder.
Since no such conclusion is any more logically implicit in the term
"discrimination" than it is in the term "murder," it is a mistake to look upon
the Supreme Court's restriction of the section 15(1) protection to members of
groups experiencing disadvantage "apart from and independent of"
immediate complaints of unequal treatment as mere "interpretation." So
fundamental a change in the meaning of the words enacted in 1982 can only
be accurately described as "amendment."
B.

Gutting the Commerce Power

Judicial amendment of the Canadian Constitution was not invented by the
Supreme Court of Canada. Its predecessor as Canada's court of last resort,
the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council, began the process. One
of the Privy Council's most audacious amendments concerned the power
bestowed on the Parliament of Canada by section 91(2) of the Constitution
Act, 1867, to make laws in relation to "the regulation of trade and
commerce."
The fact that it was listed second among the enumerated heads of federal
jurisdiction, immediately after "the public debt and property," and ahead of
such vital matters as taxation, postal service, defence, navigation and
shipping, currency, coinage, and banking, must say something about the
significance of federal regulation of trade and commerce in the eyes of those
who negotiated, drafted, and debated the 1867 Constitution. The fact that it
was expressed in more expansive language than the equivalent provision to
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the United States Constitution was certainly no accident.' 3 But a relentless
progression of restrictive Privy Council rulings between the 1880s and the
1920s pared the power to the point where it could be described by Justice
Idington of the Supreme Court of Canada as "the old forlorn hope, so many
14
times tried, unsuccessfully."'
The culmination of this line of decisions was a pronouncement in Toronto
Electric Commissioners v. Snider,15 which left little doubt that the federal
commerce power had been effectively and substantially amended by judicial
action. The Judicial Committee's ruling on the question immediately at
issue-that national labour relations legislation purporting to apply even to
local enterprises that did not fall operationally under federal jurisdiction
could not be supported by either the federal commerce power or any other
constitutional responsibility of the Parliament of Canada-was not at all
surprising in the light of earlier jurisprudence. What was surprising,
startlingly so, was Viscount Haldane's frank admission, on behalf of his Privy
Council colleagues, of how drastically their decisions had modified federal
jurisdiction to regulate trade and commerce:
It is, in their Lordship's opinion, now clear that, excepting so far as the power can be
invoked in aid of capacity conferred independently under other words in section 91,
the power to regulate trade and commerce cannot be relied6 on as enabling the
Dominion Parliament to regulate civil rights in the Provinces.'

This is breathtaking. Section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 bestows
twenty-nine heads of legislative jurisdiction on the Parliament of Canada.
Several of these-banking, bills of exchange and promissory notes, interest,
bankruptcy, and insolvency, for example-relate to commercial matters, but
none so sweepingly as head number two: "the regulation of trade and
commerce." There is nothing about head number two, apart from its breadth
and the prominence it was given near the top of the list of federal powers, that
sets it apart from the other heads of section 91. There is nothing in the
legislative history of the 1867 Constitution to indicate that the federal
commerce power was intended to play a role subordinate to other items of
federal jurisdiction, or to bear some special relationship to the powers of
provincial legislatures. If that had been the intention, surely the commerce
power would not have been expressed as a regular subsection of section 91,
but would have been treated distinctively, as, for example, the federal power
to make special "remedial laws" relating to the ordinarily provincial topic of
education was treated in section 93(4). Yet, in the absence of even a scintilla
of textual support, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council acknowledged
13.

See generally, Alexander Smith, The Commerce Power in Canada and the United States 14-27, 29

(Butterworths, 1963). Justice Gwynne commented in 1880 that the Canadian provision was
"deliberately designed specially as to have no doubt, with the view of avoiding what was believed to
be a weakness and defect in the Constitution of the United States...
City of Fredericton v The Queen,
3 SCR 505, 564 (1880).
14. In Re Board of Commerce, 60 SCR 456, 488 (1920). The story of the Canadian commerce
power up to the 1900s is told well in Smith, Commerce Power (cited in note 13).
15. [1925] AC 396 (PC).
16. Id at 410.
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in Snider that it had decided to accord section 91(2) less independent
significance than any other head of federal jurisdiction.
It is true, of course, that the Snider pronouncement related only to
Parliament's authority to "regulate civil rights in the Provinces."' 7 This did
not soften its impact, however, since the Privy Council confirmed the ability of
federal legislation to affect such rights (presumably as a consequence of
federal "paramountcy") if enacted "under other words in section 91."18
Section 91(2) had thus been relegated to a constitutional status inferior to, or
at least redundant with, that of all the other, narrower, commercially-related
subsections of section 91.
The Privy Council did not admit that it was "amending" the Constitution.
In a rather smug introduction to the reasons for judgment in Snider, Viscount
Haldane claimed that the judicial Committee's duty, "now as always, is simply
to interpret the British North America Act [as the Constitution Act, 1867 was
then called]."' 19 He was at least candid enough to concede that in performing
this function he and his colleagues "flound] themselves compelled, alike by
the structure of section 91 and by the interpretation of its terms that has now
been established by a series of authorities." 20 The "series of authorities"
consisted of the Privy Council's own previous rulings. To classify an
"interpretation" of section 91(2) that lacked any textual support, and
deprived the provision of any independent application in relation to matters
to which narrower provisions with the identical formal status applied, as
anything less than outright amendment serves only to obfuscate constitutional
realities.
C.

Expanding Provincial Taxation Powers

Section 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 restricts the taxation power of
provincial governments to "direct taxation within the Province." While this
was originally sufficient to provide the tax revenues needed to finance the
relatively inexpensive responsibilities imposed on the provinces in 1867, the
growth of those responsibilities, in both importance and cost, over the
ensuing years eventually resulted in a situation in which the provinces'
governmental functions were utterly inappropriate to their ability to fund
them. The Canadian government, whose tax powers under section 91(3) of
the Constitution are virtually limitless, filled the gap with equalization
payments to the provinces, conditional grants, and the like; but the
constitutionality of some of those expedients was open to doubt, and, in any
event, they placed the autonomy of provincial governments in considerable
21
jeopardy.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id at 400.
20. Id at 401.
21. See generally Gerard V. La Forest, Allocation of Taxation Power Under the Canadian Constitution
(Canadian Tax Foundation, 1967).
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The problem of enlarging provincial access to tax revenues was finally
solved by means of provincial sales taxes. Currently, a huge sum of money is
raised by provincial sales taxes in every province but Alberta. That would not
have been possible if the letter of section 92(2) had been respected, since that
section restricts the provinces to "direct" taxation, and sales taxes are classic
instances of indirect taxes. The Privy Council held long ago, relying on wellknown writings of political economist John Stuart Mill, that a direct tax is
"one which is demanded from the very persons who it is intended or desired
should pay it," rather than one which is collected from someone likely to pass
it on to others in the form of, for example, higher prices.2 2 Sales taxes are
clearly indirect by this test; they are collected from merchants with the
expectation that the merchants will in most circumstances increase their
prices correspondingly, leaving consumers to bear the ultimate brunt of the
tax. Although all provinces are prohibited from levying indirect taxes, all but
one now impose a tax of this nature. They are able to impose such a tax
because of a Privy Council ruling in Atlantic Smoke Shops Limited v. Conlon 23 that
effectively amended section 92(2) to make an exception to the "direct"
requirement in the case of sales taxes.
Those who are familiar with Atlantic Smoke Shops may take issue with my
characterization of its gist as a constitutional amendment. They might point
out that the levy in question was not in form a sales tax at all. On paper it was
a tax charged to the purchaser, not to the merchant; the legislation merely
designated the merchant as tax "collector," with an obligation to ensure that
each purchaser paid the tax at the time of purchase, and to account to the
provincial government for the taxes thus "collected." Therefore, the Privy
Council held, this was not an indirect sales tax; it was a direct purchase or
consumer tax. "How," one might accordingly ask, "can the decision be
justifiably described as an amendment?" It was an amendment because it
could not have been reached on the basis of accepted principles of
constitutional interpretation. In particular, it flew in the face of the longstanding "colourability" principle.
Professor Peter Hogg's textbook, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, explains the
colourability doctrine as follows:
The courts are, of course, concerned with the substance of the legislation to be
characterized and not merely its form. The 'colourability' doctrine is invoked when a
statute bears the formal trappings of a matter within jurisdiction, but in reality is
addressed to a matter outside jurisdiction. In the Alberta Taxation Reference [Attorney
General Alberta v. Attorney General Canada, AC 117 (PC) (1939)], for example, the Privy
ostensibly designed as a taxation measure,
Council held that the legislation, although
24
was in reality directed to banking.

The tax scheme challenged in Atlantic Smokeshops presented the Privy Council
with a legislative device every bit as colourable as that which they had struck
down four years earlier in the Alberta Taxation Reference. Rarely have courts
22.
23.
24.

Bank of Toronto v Lambe, 12 AC 575, 582 (PC 1887).
[1934] AC 550 (PC).
Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada 322 (Carswell, 2d ed 1985).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 55: No. I

confronted a more blatant example of legislators attempting to do indirectly
that which they cannot do directly. Yet this time the colourability doctrine
was not even mentioned in the reasons for judgment. Had it been applied as
it ought, the "interpretation" of this kind of levy as "direct taxation" would
have been impossible.
Since the words of section 92(2) cannot, when interpreted by accepted
principles, support the decision in Atlantic Smokeshops, that decision must be
considered to have been either a judicial error or a constitutional amendment.
Having been rendered almost fifty years ago, and never having been
corrected, it makes no sense to treat the ruling as an error. Having become
the basis for a revolutionary change in the tax position of the provinces
(provincial purchase or consumption taxes-universally referred to as "sales
taxes" by an undeceived public-being in force throughout most of Canada),
it ought to be obvious that the ruling wrought a constitutional amendment of
major proportions.
D.

And So On

This catalogue ofjudicial amendments to the Canadian Constitution could
be trebled in length with no difficulty. An extended study would include, for
example:
The long, tidal, line of Privy Council and Supreme Court
decisions relating to the Canadian Parliament's residual power
under the opening clause of section 91 to make laws for the
"peace, order and good government of Canada," which has
sometimes been held to confer federal jurisdiction over matters
as minor as uniform national temperance laws 25 or beautification

of the national capital, 26 and has on other occasions been found
not to authorize federal laws needed to cope with problems as
27
nationally momentous as the Great Depression of the 1930s.

-

The PatriationReference,28 in which the Supreme Court of Canada
gave itself, with historic consequences, the power to pronounce
on non-legal matters (political conventions of the Constitution),
despite the fact that section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867,

25. Russell v The Queen, 7 AC 829 (PC 1882). Although the "peace, order and good government"
clause was only one possible basis for federal competence in that case, it was long treated by the
Privy Council and other tribunals as an instance of the "P.O.G.G." power being invoked and applied.
26. Munro v National Capital Commission, 57 DLR (2d) 753 (SCC 1966).
27. Unemployment Insurance Act Reference, [1937] AC 355 (PC).
28. 125 DLR (3d) I (SCC 1981). Unlike the American courts' jurisdictional requirement of a
case or controversy," Canadian courts have jurisdiction over "referenced" cases without the
necessity of any real inter-party dispute being involved. Statutes governing the Supreme Court of
Canada, as well as the courts of appeal of every province, permit hypothetical questions of legal or
constitutional importance to be placed before the courts by the Attorney General of the jurisdiction
in question. A substantial proportion of Canadian constitutional law has been developed by this
means. See Gerald Rubin, The Nature, Use and Effect of Reference Cases in Canadian ConstitutionalLaw, in
William R. Lederman, The Courts and the Canadian Constitution 220 (McClelland & Stewart, 1964).
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under which the Court was created, seems to contemplate that,
as a "court," its task is to administer "laws."
The Anti-Inflation Act Reference,2 9 which contained prophetic
pronouncements by Justice Beetz (subsequently adopted by a
majority of his colleagues despite the fact that he dissented in
the result), confining "national dimension" uses of the federal
"peace, order and good government" power to a radicallycircumscribed range of circumstances, and bestowing on the
Parliament of Canada the "unilateral" power, nowhere
articulated in the text of the Constitution Acts, to make a
"temporary pro tanto amendment" to the Constitution in times
30
of national emergency.
The Manitoba Language Reference,3 l in which the Court decreed
that it had the authority, again nowhere to be found in the
Constitution Acts, to grant temporary validity, in the interests of
preserving civil order, to laws that it had found to be
constitutionally invalid.
Enough has already been said, however, without examining these and
similar constitutional landmarks at greater length, to demonstrate my thesis
that, in Canada at least, the judiciary has been responsible for constitutional
amendments of great import.
III
AMENDMENT LOOK-ALIKES

I do not contend that every major constitutional ruling by the courts
involves amendment. The amending decisions with which this article is
concerned are relatively rare. It may be useful, therefore, before going on to
consider the consequences ofjudicial amendment, to distinguish amendment
from other judicial solutions to constitutional problems.
The judicial decisions I classify as amendments to the Constitution are
those that, whatever the sweep of their impact, are not capable of having been
products of a fair construction of the Constitution Acts or of other documents
29. [1976] 2 SCR 373.
30. The authority for this temporary amendment power of Parliament was explained as follows
by Justice Beetz, drawing upon an earlier dictum of Viscount Haldane:
The legitimacy of that power is derived from the Constitution: when the security and
continuation of the Constitution and of the nation are at stake, the kind of power
commensurate with the situation "is only to be found in that part of the Constitution which
establishes power in the state as a whole."
Id at 528.
31. 19 DLR (4th) I (SCC 1985). The Court explained this extraordinary power as a necessary
consequence, in these circumstances, of the "rule of law" principle, which it held to be silently
present (explicitly so in the case of the Charter) in all constitutional norms. I have contended
elsewhere that the ruling really represented an application of the rule of order, rather than the rule
of law. Dale Gibson, The Rule of Non-Law: Implications of the Manitoba Language Reference, 1986
Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada. But even on itsown terms, the Court's addition to
Canada's Constitution of a principle of"rule of law" that permits constitutional law to be temporarily
ignored for reasons the Court deems advisable must surely qualify as a constitutional amendment.
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of the Canadian Constitution. In "fair construction," I include not just
obvious interpretations, but also imaginative rulings that, while perhaps
unexpected, can be shown to flow logically from words or implications in the
text.
It has been argued that the notion of fair construction is a fiction because
the inherent richness and ambiguity of language prevents constitutional text
from having a "plain meaning." While it is true that a given expression is
rarely capable of meaning only one thing, even when the limiting effect of
context is taken into account, there are limits to what it is capable of meaning.
"Elephant" cannot mean "mouse"; "banana" cannot mean "apple." "Direct
tax" cannot mean "indirect tax." Judicial rulings that go beyond those outer
limits cannot be fairly considered to be interpretive exercises. To include
indirect taxation within the concept of "direct taxation" is not to interpret the
latter term; it is to alter it, to amend it.
Others argue that to be properly interpretive, a judicial construction of
constitutional language must cleave to the meaning intended by those who
originally drafted the language. This view is unfounded as well. The courts'
task, in my estimation, is to determine what the language should mean now.
The thoughts and intentions of persons involved in the formulation and
enactment of the provision in question may be of assistance, but they can
never be conclusive. The creation of constitutional norms is a collective
endeavour, involving scores, perhaps hundreds, of politicians, consultants,
draftspersons, and others, many of whom often hold mutually opposing views,
and relatively few of whom express themselves publicly about the meaning of
those norms. In addition, the interpretational question the courts are now
asked to determine may not have occurred to any of those involved in the
creative process, and even if it did, the context in which the question now
arises is likely to be sharply different. Language has a life of its own, and it
cannot serve us as it should if not allowed to grow and mature over time like
all other life forms, especially if it is part of a Constitution expected to meet
the needs of the unpredictable future as well as those of the era in which it was
formulated. I once heard Robert Frost explain to an audience that a poem of
his had been interpreted to mean something other than he had intended. He
expressed great pleasure that his creation had grown beyond its creator's
expectations. Constitutions resemble poems in their pithiness, the richness of
their language, their intended longevity, and their reliance on interpretive
processes to develop their full potential.
Several forms of constitutional decisionmaking fall short of amendments
yet remain within the scope of fair construction. While categories overlap,
and particular classifications may be disputable, at least the following general
distinctions seem evident.
A.

Interpretation

Many constitutional decisions simply clarify the meaning of expressions
used in constitutional texts. The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled, for
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instance, that the term "principles of fundamental justice" in section 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes questions of substantial
justice as well as of mere procedural fairness,3 2 and that the right under
section 6(2)(b) of the Charter "to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any
province" applies only with respect to interprovincial impediments to
employment, not to non-territorial restrictions.3 3 Neither of these
conclusions was obvious from the face of the text, but they were both arrived
at as a result of legitimate interpretive inferences found within the text.
B.

Application

The courts are often called upon to apply well-understood constitutional
concepts to new fact situations. Is an arbitration board, for example, a "court
of competent jurisdiction" within the meaning of section 24(1) of the Charter,
and therefore empowered to award the remedies for Charter violations
authorized by that provision? Is a Human Rights Tribunal a "superior,
district, [or] county court" as contemplated by section 96 of the Constitution
Act, 1867, which requires the members of such courts to be federally
appointed? Although questions like these are often difficult to answer, their
solution does not call for anything like the creativity involved in amendment.
C.

Elaboration

In some instances, the drafters delegate to the courts the authority to flesh
out a constitutional norm that takes only skeletal form in the text.
Construction of the previously mentioned term, "principles of fundamental
justice," in section 7 of the Charter, perhaps falls into this category. An even
more generous invitation to the courts to elaborate upon incomplete
constitutional language occurs in section 23 of the Charter, which creates a
right to be educated in the minority official language of a province (French or
English) where the number of persons entitled to exercise that right "is
sufficient to warrant" providing minority language instruction and
educational facilities out of public funds.
While this task is unavoidably creative, it cannot be regarded as
amendment, since it is intended that the courts will carry out the purpose of
the original constitutional norm, rather than alter it.
D.

Reconciliation

Occasionally, courts are obliged to give a more limited interpretation or
application to a constitutional phrase than its wording would grammatically
permit because an expansive reading would be impossible to reconcile with
some other constitutional norm. Since all provisions of the Constitution are
entitled to respect, narrower interpretations are necessary in situations where
a liberal construction of two or more provisions would result in mutual
32.
33.

Motor Vehicle Act of British Columbia § 94(2) Reference, 24 DLR (4th) 536 (SCC 1985).
Law Society of Upper Canada v Skapinker, 9 DLR (4th) 161 (SCC 1984).
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incompatibility. Thus, where section 91(26) grants the Parliament of Canada
"exclusive" jurisdiction over "marriage," and section 92(12) provides that
provincial legislatures may "exclusively" make laws in relation to
"solemnization of marriage in the province," the courts have had little
alternative but to construe the term "marriage" in section 91(26) as excluding
questions of solemnization within any province. 34 And the fact that section
92(15) confers on the provinces exclusive competence over "the imposition
by fine, penalty, or imprisonment for enforcing any law of the province"
demands a narrower definition of the federal Parliament's exclusive "criminal
law" power than the standard English definition of that term, which embraces
all legislative prohibitions with accompanying penalties.3 5 Again, the exercise
is deductive rather than creative.
E.

Extension by Inference

Some exercises ofjudicial review do involve a very high order of creativity
and inigenuity, of course, but not even they can be classified as amendments if
they remain within the bounds of fair interpretation. Quite surprising
inferential extensions of meaning (the converse of the "reconciliation"
exercise) can remain interpretive in character.
Consider section 96, which states that judges of superior, district, and
county courts in each province must be appointed by the federal Governor
General. On its face, this provision relates only to the appointmentpowers of the
federal government, but it has been judicially extended to impose limitations
on the substantivefunctions that may validly be exercised by provincial courts and
tribunals. The reasoning proceeds as follows:
Only federal authorities may appoint judges to certain
categories of courts.
To avoid having this constitutional restriction defeated by
subterfuge, it must be applied not just to bodies known officially
as "superior, district, and county courts," but also to any
tribunal carrying out functions substantially the same as the
functions performed by such courts.
This means that provincial authorities cannot bestow on courts
or other tribunals whose members are provincially appointed
any of the functions normally associated with "section 96
courts."36

While that conclusion might have surprised those who were responsible for
the drafting of section 96, it is a fair extension by inference of the meaning of
the provision.
34. Re Marriage Legislation, [1912] AC 880 (PC).
35. MargarineReference, [1949] 1 SCR 1.
36. The case law on this question is voluminous. For a relatively recent and illuminating
illustration of the extended interpretation of section 96 in practice, see Reference Re Residential
Tenancies Act, 123 DLR (3d) 554 (SCC 1981).

Page 261: Winter 1992]

JUDICIAL AMENDMENTS

A highly debatable instance of extension by inference was the famous
"implied Bill of Rights" dictum of Chief Justice Sir Lyman Duff and some of
his colleagues in the Alberta Statutes Reference. s 7 In 1937, the Alberta
Legislative Assembly (Third Session) enacted the Accurate News and
Information Act ("Press Act"), which seriously constrained the ability of the
news media to criticize the new economic measures or the government that
was advancing them. The Constitution of Canada did not expressly guarantee
either the freedom of speech or the press at that time. When the
constitutionality of Alberta's legislative package was disputed by the federal
government and others, the question was referred to the Supreme Court of
Canada, which struck down the legislation. The Press Act invalidation was
based primarily on its association with the economic statutes, which were
found to interfere with the monetary and banking powers of the Parliament of
Canada, as well as on the contention that such a legislative interference with
freedom of speech constituted "criminal law," another of the federal
Parliament's exclusive domains.A8 The latter conclusion-that because of
federal responsibility for criminal law the provinces may not infringe on
freedom of speech-was in itself an important example of judicial extension
of constitutional norms by inference.
Chief Justice Duff came up with an alternative rationale for striking down
the Press Act, involving an even more dramatic extension by inference. The
1867 Constitution called for the existence of a federal "Parliament," and the
Preamble states that Canada is to have a Constitution "similar in principle to
that of the United Kingdom." Since the United Kingdom's Parliament
operates in an atmosphere of free speech, the Canadian Constitution should
be read as requiring a similar atmosphere of free speech to exist throughout
Canada. 39 Therefore, Duff and two colleagues concluded, the Alberta Press
Act was invalid for the additional reason that it offended this implicit
constitutional guarantee of free expression. 40 Although this inferential
extension of the Constitution, labelled the "Implied Bill of Rights" by
subsequent commentators, never won the support of a majority of the
Supreme Court, it was approved by a number ofjudges and academic writers.
It was considered a partial substitute for an express constitutional guarantee
of rights and freedoms in the years before any such express guarantee was
enacted. If it had ever attracted majority allegiance, it might, because of its
inferential linkage to the text of the Constitution, have escaped being
considered an amendment. This escape would have been narrow, however; it
was certainly a very extended inference.

37. [1938] 1 SCR 100.
38. This case was included in the Alberta Statutes Reference. Id at 145-47.
39. Id at 100.
40. See Dale Gibson, ConstitutionalAmendment and the Implied Bill of Rights, 12 McGill L J 497
(1966).
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Supplement

There are times when courts are called upon to remedy gaps in the
Constitution. The Constitution Act, 1867 confers on the Parliament of
Canada jurisdiction over patents (section 91(22)) and copyrights (section
91(23)), for example, but says nothing about trademarks. Similarly, it makes
the legislatures of the provinces responsible for certain forms of licensing for
revenue-raising purposes (section 92(9)), and for "the incorporation of
companies with provincial objects" (section 92(11)); but it is silent as to
licensing for regulatory purposes and as to the incorporation of companies with
federal objects.
When attempting to fill such gaps, the courts play a supplementary role
that approaches, in the creativity called for, the function I call judicial
amendment. As long as they base their conclusions on inferential reasoning
rooted in the text, however, I would not consider the process to involve
amendment. For example, jurisdiction over trademarks has been held to
reside in the federal "trade and commerce" power. 41 This makes good sense
in light of the fact that patents and copyrights are both federal
responsibilities. Control over the incorporation of federal companies has also
been ascribed to the federal Parliament (as an aspect of its residual "peace,
order and good government" power4 2 ), which also seems to be a fair
inference from the explicit distribution of powers under sections 91 and 92.
Finally, regulatory licensing seems to fall, as it logically should, to the order of
43
government having operational control over the activity in question.
It would be difficult to characterize any of these rulings as amendments
because the interpretations are reasonably derived from the text of the
Constitution. When the courts, however, fashion constitutional supplements
from whole cloth, as I believe the Supreme Court of Canada did in the
Manitoba Language Reference,44 it seems fair to say that they have surpassed the
role of constitutional interpreters and have become amenders.
IV
RAMIFICATIONS

A. Judicial Amendments Are Not All Bad
It should not be supposed that I necessarily object to judicial amendments
of the Constitution. The point of the earlier examples was not to criticize
substance but to illustrate process. To some of the particular amendments
highlighted earlier, such as the "discrete and insular minority" gloss on
equality rights, I do indeed take strong exception. With others, such as the
sales tax/purchase tax masquerade, I am quite content. Nor do I find fault in
41. Canada Standard Trade Mark Cate, [1937] AC 405 (PC); MacDonald v Vapor Canada, [1977] 2
SCR 134.
42. John Deere v Wharton, [1915] AC 330 (PC).
43. La Forest, Allocation of Taxation Power at 134 (cited in note 21).
44. See note 31.
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general with the fact that major constitutional amendments are made by
courts. Observers of a more populist persuasion than I may consider it
inappropriate for judicial appointees, lacking a democratic mandate, to
engage in outright alteration of the country's most fundamental legal and
political document. I do not-not absolutely, at any rate. There are, indeed,
compelling reasons to believe that occasional judicial amendment of the
Constitution is positively beneficial, and sometimes unavoidable.
The formal process for amending the Constitution of Canada, set out in
sections 38 to 49 of the Constitution Act, 1982, is exceedingly cumbersome.
As the lengthy debate over the Meech Lake Accord demonstrated, 45 that
process can consume prodigious quantities of time, energy, money, and
political will, without necessarily producing change. Even in situations far less
politically charged than the Meech Lake imbroglio, constitutional
amendments are usually hard to achieve by the formal route. The reasons for
this are several. Politicians are often too preoccupied with more immediate
concerns to be much interested in the future health of the Constitution.
Moreover, they are reluctant to be associated with proposals (such as
suggestions to expand the constitutional rights of religious or linguistic
minorities 4 6 ) that would risk alienating significant segments of the electorate.
On certain matters (such as the consequences of restricting "fundamental
justice" in section 7 of the Charter to purely procedural matters), judges are
simply better qualified than politicians to decide. On others (the narrowing of
the federal commerce power is a good example4 7), the existence in the formal
process of a veto power on the part of the affected government all but
precludes any change by legislators. Finally, some situations (the need for a
device to prevent chaos resulting from the wholesale invalidation of provincial
legislation in the Manitoba Language Reference, for instance 48 ) call for a more
rapid response than formal procedures permit. In circumstances like these,
necessary constitutional amendments might never be made if they were not
fashioned by judicial hands.
45. See Alan C. Cairns, Disruptions: Constitutional Struggles, From the Charter to Meech Lake
(McClelland & Stewart, 1991); Richard Simeon, Why Did the Meech Lake Accord Fail?, in Ronald L.
Watts & Douglas M. Brown, Canada: The State of the Federation 1990, 15 (Inst Intergovernmental
Relations, 1991).
46. It is very unlikely that the constitutional about-face that occurred in Reference Re: Ontario
Separate Secondary Schools, 40 DLR (4th) 18 (SCC 1987), as to the application of Roman Catholic
separate school rights under section 93 to the secondary school level could have been achieved by
formal constitutional amendment.
47. See notes 13-20 and accompanying text. It is true, of course, that the federal authorities had
no formal veto power at that stage of Canada's constitutional development, when the amendment
power resided with the British Parliament. There can be no doubt, however, that a defacto power of
constitutional veto had by that time been bestowed on the Government of Canada by constitutional
convention.
48. 19 DLR (4th) I (SCC 1985). In my view, swift legislative remedial measures would have
been possible in that situation and would have been preferable to the spurious invocation of the
"rule of law" to which the Court felt driven. On the other hand, the Court may well have been aware
of some sub-surface impediment to effective legislative action. The point is that when crisis looms, a
judicial response may offer the only sure solution.
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The fact that judges amend the Constitution is not, therefore, always a
problem in itself. It is inevitable in some circumstances, and at times
beneficial. The undemocratic nature of the process is a legitimate cause for
concern, however. Some think that it is dangerous even to acknowledge
publicly that courts sometimes amend constitutions. They seem to fear that
the electorate will then insist that the power be taken away. In my view, that is
a misplaced concern. The public already knows what the courts are doing,
and I think its respect for the judiciary is less likely to be damaged by an open
acknowledgement of the truth than by a transparent denial that the courts are
going beyond mere "interpretation."
It is nevertheless anomalous that a democratic constitution should be
capable of outright amendment by an undemocratic institution and
undemocratic procedures. Therefore, courts should exercise self-restraint in
these matters, permitting themselves to engage in constitutional amendment
only when it is either inevitable that they do so, or when it would clearly be
detrimental to the nation to leave the matter to the formal amendment
process. In all other circumstances, judges should restrict their interpretation
to the (rather generous, after all) forms of judicial review that fall within the
scope of fair construction.
Even in the circumstances where it is appropriate, judicial amendment of
the Constitution involves certain serious difficulties. These difficulties
concern how judges perform the task. The remainder of this article will
address factors that impair the ability of the Supreme Court of Canada to
perform the amendment function as effectively as it should.
B.

Insufficient Representation

Supreme Court judges are selected from members of Canada's elite. Most
of them know little, from personal experience, about some of the most trying
problems ordinary citizens are commonly confronted with in the course of
their daily lives. Was it a mere coincidence that the Supreme Court of Canada
was more sympathetic to the inequality complaint of a non-citizen deprived
49
by citizenship of the right to be a lawyer in British Columbia (in Andrews )
than to that of accused persons deprived by geography of procedural rights
they would have in another part of the country (in Turpin5 0 )? I do not think
SO.
In all of its work, whether constitutional or not, the Court would function
more satisfactorily, in my view, if its membership better reflected the diversity
of the country's population. While this concern is not exclusively relevant to
the problem of judicial amendment of the Constitution, it deserves special
emphasis in the context of the Court's role as an occasional amender of
Canada's most fundamental law. The proposal with which this article
49.
50.

[1989] 1 SCR 143.
[1989] 1 SCR 1296.
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concludes would ameliorate some of the consequences of the Supreme
Court's inadequate representation of the people of Canada.
C.

Lack of Information and Expertise

Even if it were possible for any nine individuals to ever be reasonably
representative of a country's population, those nine people could not be
expected to appreciate fully all the factors involved in, or all the interests
affected by, a major amendment to the country's constitution. Such
amendments can have a profound influence on economic growth, political
power, or cultural development; they usually affect matters having deep
historical roots, and they often draw upon foreign constitutional experience.
They also may have an impact upon policing, education, health care,
immigration, agriculture, transportation, and many other aspects of life. No
nine lawyers, however learned and wise, could ever possess the experience or
the expertise necessary to understand the full future implications of major
constitutional amendments.
The most significant difference between the formal constitutional
amendment procedures established by the Constitution Act, 1982, and the
process by which the Supreme Court of Canada amends the Constitution is
that the formal route entails greater opportunities for the expression of
pertinent points of view and for taking advantage of relevant expertise. Even
the simplest types of amendment (such as unilateral modifications by the
Parliament of Canada or by provincial legislatures to their own internal
constitutions in accordance with sections 44 and 45) call at least for debates in
the responsible legislative assemblies in the bright light of news media
scrutiny. Other types of amendments require much more public involvement:
debates in the legislatures of all affected jurisdictions (section 43); or in the
federal Parliament and at least seven provincial legislatures (section 38); or,
for amendments concerning the most important matters, in all federal and
provincial legislative bodies (section 41). Moreover, the governments in
question customarily supplement these legislative debates concerning
proposed constitutional changes with public hearings, technical studies
performed by staff and commissioned experts, interminable intergovernmental discussions and negotiations, and investigations by special
legislative committees. First, second, and third drafts are circulated,
criticized, revised, published, editorially supported and attacked, lobbied for
and against, modified, rescrutinized, renegotiated, debated in one legislative
chamber after another, and eventually, months or years after the proposal was
conceived, adopted or rejected.
In the case of judicial amendment, by contrast, the alteration has usually
been made, in its final form, before the general public is even aware that a
change is in prospect. Sometimes the amendment does not even receive
much publicity at that point. Canadians are still generally unaware of the
radical judicial restriction of their equality rights that occurred in Turpin. It is
true that judicial amendments are likely to have been preceded by intense
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research, discussion, debate, and perhaps even negotiation, on the part of the
Supreme Court judges themselves (although the unanimity of Turpin suggests
that this is not always the case). These studies and exchanges are necessarily
constrained, however, by the severe limitation of time and research resources
available to the nine judges; they cannot be considered to approximate the
opportunities that the formal amendment process presents for informed
consideration of all factors and consequences.
It is also true that the Court has the benefit of both written and oral
arguments by skilled counsel representing opposing points of view, as well as
judgments prepared by lower level judges in the same case. If evidence was
presented at the lower levels, that is available also. The fact that all attorney
generals, federal and provincial, are entitled to be notified of, and to
intervene in, all Supreme Court of Canada litigation involving constitutional
issues, 5' and the possibility of other relevant interest groups also being
accorded intervenor status, 52 reduce the likelihood that major considerations
will escape the Court's notice. If they should be overlooked or dealt with in a
manner considered inappropriate, there is certain to be astringent criticism
from both the academic community and the public media.
These factors are not entirely satisfactory substitutes, however, for the fulltilt negotiation and public debate that usually animates the formal process of
constitutional amendment. The points of view expressed in argument, and
the evidence by which they are supported, are restricted in scope by the
factual issues in dispute, and by the Court's limited tolerance for intervenor
briefs. Time and resource pressures are severe. Public acceptance of
constitutional amendments brought about in this manner is difficult to win in
a democratic society. Also, ex post facto criticism by academics and others
comes too late to prevent errors from being made. Admittedly, the relative
ease with which judicial amendments can be enacted permits the Court to
make future adjustments in the light of criticisms,

53

but only at the cost of

much confusion and inconvenience for those individuals, organizations,
businesses, and governmental agencies whose activities are affected by
constitutional considerations. It would be better if the Court, possessed of all
pertinent data, got it right the first time.
V
A

PROPOSAL

Having contended that the Supreme Court of Canada effects major
constitutional amendments from time to time and that the process by which it
occurs is subject to serious shortcomings, it is incumbent on me to suggest a
51. SCC Rule 32, SOR 87-292.
52. See Bernard M. Dickens, A Canadian Development: Non-Party Intervention, 40 Modern L Rev
666 (1977).
53. There is an indication in the Court's decision in R. v Hess and R. v .% uyen, [1990] 2 SCR 906
(companion cases), that it may be willing to modify its "discrete and insular minority" ruling. See
Gibson, 40 U New Brunswick LJ 2 (cited in note 11).
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way in which these shortcomings might be eliminated or ameliorated. Such a
suggestion will now be advanced, though tentatively and with the expectation
that its examination by other constitutionalists will result in its improvement
or, perhaps, its rejection in favour of a more satisfactory solution.
The proposal is to create a permanent Constitutional Advisory
Commission to assist the Supreme Court of Canada in situations where there
is a prospect that a forthcoming ruling of the Court will effect an amendment
to the Constitution or will bring about a constitutional revolution equivalent
to an amendment. The Commission could, incidentally, also prove to be a
valuable adjunct to the formal amendment process.
A.

The Commission

The name is of no significance, of course. "Constitutional Advisory
Commission" is proposed simply because it is convenient to have a label by
which to identify the body for discussion purposes. The words "advisory"
and "commission" suggest desirable characteristics for such a body to
possess: a purely recommendatory role, independence, and permanence.
The titular similarity to the Constitutional Advisory Committee established
under the U.S.S.R. Constitution in its final years is not entirely accidental. I
had occasion to examine the Soviet Committee under the tutelage of Dr.
Alexandre Yakovlev, director of the U.S.S.R. (now Russian) Institute of State
and Law, and was struck by certain of its characteristics. 54 Another source of
inspiration was a proposal by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis for a research
55
service to assist the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Commission would consist of a manageable number of persons
(between five and eleven, the latter perhaps being a convenient number),
appointed for substantial terms (approximately six years) by federal and
provincial governments (perhaps each jurisdiction appointing one member).
These appointed individuals, with the assistance of an adequate research staff,
would study and report upon constitutional questions referred to them by the
Supreme Court of Canada and the governments of Canada or of any of the
provinces.
There should be an approximately equal number of men and women on
the Commission, and an attempt should also be made to have its composition
reflect the ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity of the country. A high level
of professional competence should also be a sine qua non for each member,
though this does not necessarily mean the legal competence we expect from
Supreme Court justices. On the contrary, while it would be desirable that
some members of the Commission be legally trained, it would probably be
undesirable if a majority of them were. Expertise in economics, political
science, sociology, and history would also be sought, as would experience in
54. See Alexandre Yakovlev & Dale Gibson, The Bear Awakens: Conversations About the Soviet
Constitutional Revolution (forthcoming, U Manitoba Legal Research Inst).
55. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative and Administrative Lawmaking. A Proposed Research
Service for the Supreme Court, 71 Minn L Rev 1 (1986-87).
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business (large and small), labour unions, government, and the helping
professions. It would not be possible to meet all these criteria in any single
panel of commissioners, of course, but the effort should be made to come as
close to doing so as possible. Designing a technique that would ensure
adequate representation and professional competence, while permitting each
jurisdiction to select a member, would be challenging, but not impossible.
Funding for the Commission would come from all federal and provincial
governments, perhaps in proportion to each government's share of total
Canadian tax revenues. This funding, an annual appropriation, could be
guaranteed by requiring the approval of some informed and impartial
authority such as the Chief Justice of Canada.
B.

Initiating Commission Studies

The Constitutional Advisory Commission could be called upon to study
and report on prospective constitutional alterations in two distinct
circumstances: judicial and governmental. Although the potential usefulness
of the Commission as a supplement to the formal political amendment
process should not be overlooked, it is the former to which the present article
is chiefly addressed.
Judicial references could be initiated by the request of a single judge of the
Supreme Court of Canada (two if there were a fear of an occasional loose
judicial cannon). This request would occur when a judge reached the
conclusion, after the close of oral arguments in a case, that there was a
reasonable likelihood that the Court would determine an issue in the case in a
manner that would be tantamount to a constitutional amendment, or that
would involve a major new direction in constitutional interpretation. The
Commission would analyze the question, report to the Court on the probable
consequences of the proposed amendment or change of direction, and
suggest possible alternative responses that might be open. The Commission
would have a designated time period to report its findings (six months might
be generally appropriate). During this time period, the Court would be
precluded from issuing reasons for judgment in the case.
Governments that wished to have the Commission's opinion about
possible constitutional amendments would also be free to refer questions to
it. This could be in lieu of legislative inquiries, but it is probably not realistic
to expect that Parliament or the provincial legislatures would often wish to
circumvent their own committees. A more likely role for the Commission
would be to provide technical data relative to amendment proposals under
study by legislative committees. Because governments have alternative
resources open to them that are not available to the Court, however, it would
probably be wise to give judicial references priority over governmental
references in time-pressed situations.
It might not be easy to ensure continuous employment for the
Commission if judicial and governmental references were its sole source of
projects. Therefore, it could be given the authority to launch initiative studies
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of its own concerning the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of particular aspects
of the Constitution, and possible future improvements. Of course, these selfinitiated projects would yield priority to judicial or governmental references.
C. Modus Operandi
The Commission's methods would be chiefly of its own design, and they
would probably vary considerably in accordance with the needs of particular
projects. The methods would certainly include extensive socio-political-legal
research by in-house staff and, if necessary, by commissioned scholars. Sole
responsibility for the content of research reports would lie with the authors of
the reports. All research would be publicly accessible, with its authors
identified, after the release of the Commission's final report. Consultations
with organizations and groups likely to be affected would probably be a
normal procedure. In addition, public hearings or a call for the submission of
briefs by members of the public might sometimes also be appropriate.
Although the Commission's deliberations would be secret, its final report
on any matter, containing fully reasoned arguments in support of its
conclusions, would be published. Dissenting opinions would also be included
and their authors identified. This final report would be available for purchase
by members of the public. It would probably be reasonable to permit a brief
delay (no more than a month) between the submission of a Commission
report to the referring authority and its release to the public.
D.

Significance of Commission Recommendations

Recommendations of the Commission would not be binding on the Court
or on governments. The Court would be obligated, however, to give the
Commission's report due consideration before reaching a final decision in any
case involving that issue. Governments would be free to ignore Commission
recommendations altogether, but they would be answerable, of course, to the
court of public opinion for having done so.
VI
CONCLUSION

It is reassuring to be able to state one's conclusions in the words of others.
The basic premise of this article has been the need for what Professor Paul
Weiler long ago referred to as "frank recognition of judicial responsibility for
constitutional change." 56 Although I am more convinced than Professor
Weiler and certain other commentators of the general desirability of
constitutional amendment by the courts, I share Weiler's concern about
whether the Supreme Court of Canada is "institutionally equipped to make
the judgments required for national policy-making." 57 Professor Patrick
56. Paul C. Weiler, The Supreme Court and the Law of Canadian Federalism, in Jacob S. Ziegel, ed,
Law and Social Change 39, 51 (1973).
57. Id.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 55: No. I

Monahan has said that "the exercise of power should be subject to collective
debate and deliberation."

58

It is for these reasons that I have borrowed and extended the proposal of
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis that courts of last resort need a "research
5 9 If
service" to assist them with the arduous task of 'judicial lawmaking."
such a resource is desirable in ordinary instances ofjudicial lawmaking, how
much more is it needed in the case of judicial amendments to the
Constitution, the "supreme law of Canada"? 60 It is often remarked that war is
too important to be left to generals alone, and it is equally true that
amendment of the Constitution is too important to be left to judges alone.

58. Patrick S. Monahan, Judicial Review and Democracy: A Theory ofJudicial Review, 21 U British
Colum L Rev 87 (1987). I should add, however, that I do not travel with Professor Monahan all the
way to his destination. Whereas he is not willing to bypass the democratic process even "in the name
of the right answers," my sole concern is with getting the answers right. My desire to see the Court
have greater access to the fruits of "collective debate and deliberation" is to help it find the right
answers, rather than to enrich the democratic process for its own sake.
59. Davis, 71 Minn L Rev I (cited in note 55).
60. Constitutional Act, 1982, pt I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 52(l).

